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Abstract 
Acquisition cycle time—roughly speaking, the development lead time to field a working 
system once we have identified a need for a new materiel solution—is a hot topic in defense 
circles. This work takes a data-driven look at historical and current acquisition program cycle 
times. We show that the trend toward longer cycle times over the past few decades is 
restricted to a handful of high-profile programs, which has profound implications for effective 
policy response. We also show evidence that cycle times are driven by system complexity, 
and that schedule slip is associated primarily with overly optimistic schedule estimates. We 
conclude with a discussion of the increasing importance of software for development lead 
times, and the general problem of trading capability for timeliness in acquisition programs. 
Introduction 
The Cycle Time Problem—Perception 
Cycle times (or development lead times) for defense weapon systems are a hot topic 
in the defense world. In September 2014, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, the Honorable Frank Kendall, issued Version 3 of the Better Buying Power 
(BBP) initiative. One focus area of BBP 3.0 is to “reduce cycle time while ensuring sound 
investments” (Kendall, 2014). The lead article (Schultz, 2014) in the November–December 
2014 issue of AT&L Magazine was entitled “Please Reduce Cycle Time.” RAND produced a 
2014 report entitled Prolonged Cycle Times and Schedule Growth in Defense Acquisition: A 
Literature Review (Riposo, McKernan, & Kaihoi, 2014). The House Armed Services 
Committee held hearings in October 2015 on the topic “Shortening the Defense Acquisition 
Cycle.” 
Many commenters on defense acquisition have asserted that it now takes too long to 
develop and field new systems, and that we should do something about it. They say that the 
pace of technological advancement, especially in electronics and information technology, is 
now so fast that our “advanced” military systems are nearly obsolete by the time they are 
fielded. Even seemingly mundane systems, such as troop transport vehicles and cargo 
aircraft, seem to take forever to field. 
The various stakeholders in the defense community have put forward numerous 
theories for what is causing the problem, many of which place the blame squarely on 
someone else. Worse yet, the appropriate policy response to the cycle time problem 
depends sharply on which theory one subscribes to. Some observers diagnose excessive 
oversight and prescribe a more laissez-faire approach to acquisition. Others diagnose 
unaffordable ambitions and unnecessarily demanding requirements, and prescribe appetite 
suppression and fiscal discipline. Still others diagnose inept management and excessive 
bureaucracy, and prescribe streamlined processes and organizations. 
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The Cycle Time Problem—Reality 
In this paper, we will address several important questions related to the cycle time 
problem. First, we will consider empirically whether there is a general cycle time problem 
across all programs, or a specific cycle time problem within a few programs. Second, we will 
look at some candidate reasons why development takes as long as it does. Finally, we will 
consider the overarching question of how to decide what to try to buy, and how to try to buy 
it, given an understanding of how long it is likely to take. 
Cycle Times for Typical Programs Are Not Increasing 
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of cycle times1 for Major Defense Acquisition Program 
(MDAP) subprograms (including initial development) as a function of when each system 
reached its Initial Operational Capability (IOC), or equivalent. Going back to the late 1980s, 
there is no apparent upward trend. Statistical analysis confirms that the trend is 
indistinguishable from zero, and that the median cycle time has been roughly eight years 
over that entire span. This absence of trend in the median holds for all commodity types—
aircraft, ground systems, space systems, ships, etc. 
 
 Program/Subprogram Cycle Time by IOC Year 
Why, then, is there a perception that cycle times have been getting worse and 
worse? Figure 2 shows the same data, but with each point now proportional to the final (or 
                                            
 
 
1 Cycle time is defined here as the time in years from program initiation to IOC or equivalent. For most 
programs, initiation is at or just before what is now called Milestone B. For some programs, initiation 
is at Milestone (MS) A, or even earlier if the program began as a Technology Demonstration program. 
For programs with no formal IOC, the equivalent milestone might be OPEVAL, First Unit Equipped, 
etc. The plot shows cycle times for ~100 subprograms for which both cost and schedule data were 
available. 
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most recent estimated) total procurement cost of the system being developed, in inflation-
adjusted dollars. 
 
 Cycle Time by IOC Year Showing Relative Program Size 
Here, there is a noticeable upward trend for the programs that are spending the most 
money on procurement. The cycle times for these highly visible programs may be driving the 
perception that things are taking longer. 
Cycle Time Growth Is Getting Worse for Some Commodity Types 
The sense that things are taking longer is driven not just by actual cycle times, but 
also by cycle time growth, or “schedule slip.” Even where programs are not taking any 
longer than they previously did, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Congress 
notice when programs take longer than promised.  
Even here, there is no significant overall statistical trend in program schedule growth 
over the past 25+ years. Figure 3 shows the relative schedule growth of each of the 
subprograms portrayed in Figure 1 and Figure 2, broken out by commodity type. Unlike the 
overall cycle time story, here there are significant differences among commodity types. 
Overall schedule growth trends are flat or downward (with occasional outliers) among 
ground systems, aircraft, missiles, and ships. The trend is upward for space systems and 
Command, Control, Communications, & Intelligence (C3I) systems. In addition, instances of 
individual programs with schedule growth well above the overall trend for their commodity 
type are becoming more common. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 76 - 
 
 Percent Schedule Growth by IOC Year for Various Commodity Types 
Of course, schedule growth does not necessarily indicate poor program execution. It 
may be that the program’s funding was cut. It may be that requirements were changed. Or, it 
may be that the original schedule estimate was unreasonable. 
We computed a measure of relative schedule optimism for MDAPs, defined as the 
difference between the average cycle time for programs of the same commodity type and 
the given program’s estimated cycle time at program initiation, divided by the commodity 
average. Thus, for example, a program forecast to take six years when the average for its 
commodity type is eight years would have a relative schedule optimism of (8–6)/8 = 25%. 
Larger numbers indicate more optimism; negative numbers indicate pessimism relative to 
the average. Figure 4 shows a graph of cycle time growth versus this metric. We see that a 
clear relationship exists between schedule optimism and schedule growth for both new start 
programs and modifications of existing systems. Interestingly, the average percent schedule 
growth for a given level of optimism is greater than the amount of optimism. This suggests 
either that excessive optimism is a symptom of a deeper problem, or that there are 
cascading effects from being too optimistic. We will return to that question when we discuss 
software development in the section titled The Special Case of Software. 
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 Relationship Between Schedule Optimism and Schedule Growth 
Do Cancelled Programs Make the Picture Look Better or Worse? 
A confounding factor in any study of MDAP cycle times has been the high rate of 
program cancellations over the past 15+ years. As famously reported in the Decker-Wagner 
report (2011),2 between 1995 and 2009, the Army spent roughly one quarter of its 
Development, Test, and Evaluation (DT&E) funding on programs that delivered fielded 
capability. The other Services were by no means immune to this problem. 
Cancelled programs bias the statistics on cycle time by censoring data from 
programs that would tend to take longer than average if carried to completion. The effect of 
individual cancellations on average or median cycle time depends on why the program was 
cancelled. Programs that were cancelled because they were going to be obsolete by the 
time they were fielded3 should have their expected durations included in the distribution of 
cycle time outcomes if our goal is to understand the extent to which programs take too long 
to be relevant or timely. Programs that were cancelled for other reasons—for example, 
technical infeasibility or unaffordability—do not generally tell us anything about achievable 
cycle times for executable programs. 
                                            
 
 
2 The actual title of this report is Army Strong: Equipped, Trained and Ready: Final Report of the 2010 
Army Acquisition Review. It is often referred to as “the Decker-Wagner report,” after its two co-
chairmen, Gilbert F. Decker and Louis C. Wagner. 
3 Obsolescence can be due to changes in the threat environment, geopolitical events, new 
technologies, etc. 
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However, cancelled programs are certainly relevant to the larger question of how 
long it takes to mitigate a capability gap, once it has been identified. Of the major programs 
cancelled since 2000, few if any were cancelled solely due to premature obsolescence. In 
most cases where obsolescence was cited by OSD or the Service as a causal factor, the 
program was also technically infeasible or unaffordable. It is not unreasonable to think of the 
current Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program as the direct continuation of the earlier 
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) and Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) 
programs. By that measure, the Marine Corps has been attempting to acquire a long-range 
high-speed amphibious troop carrier since 1995, and does not expect to be able to field one 
until 2025 at the earliest. In the same way, the Army’s ongoing attempts to replace the OH-
58 Kiowa scout helicopter began in 1985 with the Comanche program. Each Service has 
outstanding modernization requirements left unfilled by failed programs; not all of those 
requirements have any current MDAP attempting to meet them. The delays in fielding these 
capabilities may have operational impacts, but they do not seem to result from inefficient 
“acquisition” in the usual sense. 
Execution or Expectations? 
The historical cycle time data raise some important questions. First, do long cycle 
times reflect an acquisition process problem (to be addressed by changes to the acquisition 
system) or an outlier problem (to be addressed by root cause analysis and improved 
oversight)? It would probably be neither efficient nor effective to overhaul the entire 
acquisition system if most programs are executing reasonably under the current system. 
Second, is this a problem of execution or of expectation? How long should it take to 
develop a fifth-generation fighter aircraft, or a first-ever tilt-rotor transport aircraft, or a high-
speed amphibious assault vehicle? Were the original schedule estimates implausible? 
Where do the development schedules found in Acquisition Program Baselines come from, 
anyway? 
Finally, to what extent are our acquisition processes the pacing factor in MDAP 
development? Are there unnecessary regulations that slow down development without 
adding value? Are there unnecessary administrative processes (either within OSD or within 
the Services) that delay development? Is testing a cause of delay, or merely the bearer of 
bad news? Are there technical reasons why we should not expect to be able to go much 
faster than we currently do? 
Which Came First—The Program or the Schedule? 
When deciding which new programs to start and what kind of system they should 
aim to produce, decision-makers are informed by cost and schedule estimates. The National 
Air and Space Administration (NASA) goes so far as to treat cost and schedule jointly, 
recognizing both that they are highly correlated and that changes driven by one will affect 
the other. No one is surprised when the cost estimates are based on the content of the 
program—the capabilities the system is supposed to provide, the materials it will use, the 
maturity (or immaturity) of the technologies to be employed, etc. OSD performs an 
independent cost estimate for all major acquisitions, which is taken seriously during 
milestone deliberations and tends to offset some of the more optimistic tendencies of the 
sponsoring Services.  
There is no corresponding attention paid to OSD concerns about schedules, 
however. Not infrequently, the initial schedule estimate for an MDAP is not an estimate at 
all, but a constraint set externally with little regard to program content or historical 
precedent. Sometimes this is driven by anticipated external demands for a system that is to 
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be used on multiple platforms, as was the case for several of the Joint Tactical Radio 
System (JTRS) subprograms. Sometimes it is driven by a planned retirement agenda for 
existing systems, such as the plan for the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft to replace the U-2. 
Sometimes it seems to be driven by impatience; the Army’s never-quite-started Ground 
Combat Vehicle program was told the delivery date of the first production vehicle in its Initial 
Capabilities Document before even a design concept had been identified.  
How Long Should It Take? 
No one would argue with the claim that a cost estimate should be based on the 
content of the program, or that it should be informed by the history of past efforts to develop 
similar things. Surprisingly, the analogous argument for schedules gets much less traction. 
The link between program content and development cycle time has not been as clearly 
established among decision-makers. There is a lingering suspicion that better management, 
less red tape, or less oversight would allow successful completion of development projects 
much more quickly than they have been done in the past. 
There have been some substantive studies that looked at this question in specific 
domains. Among the most comprehensive is Gene Bearden’s work at the Aerospace 
Corporation on the cost and schedule drivers of space probes. Dr. Bearden developed a 
sophisticated complexity metric for space probe projects, based on the technical details of 
the operational domain (earth orbit or planetary), the propulsion technology, the required 
data links, the payload instruments, etc. He then showed that there is a powerful and 
consistent relationship between project complexity and development cycle time. More 
importantly, nearly all partial or complete mission failures occurred when NASA attempted to 
develop and launch probes more quickly than the estimated required development time. 
Figure 5 shows this relationship. 
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 Relationship Between Space Probe Complexity, Development Time, and 
Mission Success  
(Courtesy of and reprinted by permission of the Aerospace Corporation) 
We also investigated whether MDAP cycle times are related to either the number of 
Critical Technology Elements (CTEs) identified in the program’s Technology Readiness 
Assessment (TRA), or the number of distinct program requirement records in the 
“Performance” fields of the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) 
system. Both are positively correlated with cycle time, although we did not have CTE data 
for enough programs to establish statistical significance. For requirement counts, there is a 
strongly significant relationship with cycle time during times of growing defense budgets, 
and no relationship at all in times of decreasing budgets.4 These results taken together 
suggest that schedule is driven by program content, but that programs perhaps shed 
requirements in times of tight budgets. 
The Special Case of Software 
The connection between complexity and cycle time is also well understood in the 
software industry. In his pioneering book The Mythical Man-Month, Fred Brooks (1975) 
presented a few key facts about software development projects: 
                                            
 
 
4 Given that the raw number of requirement records in DAMIR is only weakly correlated with actual 
program complexity, the existence of a strongly significant (p = 0.0002) relationship between 
requirements records and cycle time is somewhat surprising. The fact that this relationship is only 
apparent during times of growing budget is even more surprising. It is possible that this metric is 
measuring bureaucratic complexity more than technical complexity. 
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 Adding staff to a software project that is behind schedule makes it take 
longer. 
 There is a lower bound on the number of defects in a software system. The 
more complex the system, the higher this bound. 
 Software development consists of completing known work and discovering 
new work. There are fundamental limits on the efficiency of both aspects. 
 The duration of a software development project depends strongly on the 
degree of coordination required among the various software modules. 
Lawrence Putnam (1978) used analogous reasoning about completion and discovery 
to derive a quantitative model of project duration. He found that total development cost is a 
function of schedule—but not in the expected sense that a longer project costs more. 
Rather, there is a natural “most efficient” schedule for a given set of requirements, and any 
attempt to accelerate the development to finish more quickly than that natural duration 
results in increased cost. Worse still, complex projects are only slightly compressible; there 
is a sharp asymptotic limit to how fast you can try to complete the project without breaking it. 
Figure 6 shows this relationship schematically. For schedules longer than the natural 
schedule, cost increases roughly linearly with duration due to low staff utilization, as shown 
by the dashed line. For schedules shorter than the natural schedule, staff utilization is high, 
but completion outpaces discovery, leading to inefficient rework and low quality. Schedules 
significantly shorter than the natural schedule are simply not possible, and development 
efforts attempting to go faster than that generally fail. 
 
 Cost as a Function of Duration for a Given Set of Software 
Requirements 
Are Weapons Systems Like Software Systems? 
We have shown that feasible schedules for space systems and for software seem to 
be constrained by program complexity. Is this true for all weapon systems? If not, which 
systems might it be true for? 
Clearly, complexity is not a factor when buying truly commercial items. By extension, 
complexity should not be a factor when buying systems that are minor modifications of 
commercial items, or that use only established commercial technologies. This is at the heart 
of the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO’s) recurring admonition that acquisition best 
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practice requires that all critical technologies for a program be mature5 before MS B. It is 
also central to the Decker-Wagner report’s taxonomy of acquisition risk categories, with 
corresponding development timelines. In that report, a low-risk acquisition is defined to be 
one that purchases an existing commercial item or modifies an existing system. A moderate-
risk acquisition is defined to be acquisition of a system that uses only mature, proven 
technologies. Even then, the report cautions that you should expect 6 to 11 years from 
Materiel Development Decision (MDD) to MS C if you are developing a new system that 
does not use exclusively pre-existing components (p. 99). 
However, maintaining our technological military advantage cannot be accomplished 
by only buying things that already exist. The Decker-Wagner report advises the Army to 
manage risk in its acquisition portfolio by limiting the proportion of higher-risk programs to 
“only those [systems] that are truly urgently needed because they represent ‘game-
changing,’ revolutionary military capability, e.g., atomic bomb, night vision, fire-and-forget 
missiles, and stealth” (p.106). It also cautions that you should expect an 8–14-year 
development cycle (MDD to MS C) for such systems, even if you do everything right. 
Are Weapon Systems Actually Software Systems? 
There is another, more compelling reason to think that weapon system acquisition 
programs might behave like software development programs—namely, that they are 
software development programs. Nearly every MDAP today involves more software than 
even the most software-intensive programs of 20 years ago. The F-35 aircraft system, in the 
culmination of a trend begun more than 50 years ago, has almost no functions that are not 
implemented, mediated, or controlled in software. 
We have noted that there is a natural minimum duration for a software development 
program. Even if it were true that hardware development and integration are no harder today 
than they have been in the past, we would expect there to be a size of software effort at 
which the software development portions of the program begin to dominate the schedule. 
Historically, the critical path for system development has run mostly through the hardware 
side of the project. Software contributed vital capabilities, but only a small portion of the 
program cost or duration. As we design systems that perform more and more of their 
functions using software, that might no longer be true. 
In fact, there is some evidence that we may already be reaching the turnover point 
where software development drives schedule duration. To test the plausibility of this idea, I 
used the COCOMO-II software effort estimation tool to estimate the duration of large, 
difficult (but not too difficult) software development projects, as a function of Source Lines of 
Code (SLOC). I then collected data on the cycle times of recent software-intensive MDAPs, 
along with their SLOC at IOC. The results are shown in Figure 7. 
                                            
 
 
5 The GAO defines maturity, for this purpose, as a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of 6 or higher. 
TRL 6 is defined as successful demonstration of a representative prototype operating in an 
environment that is operationally relevant, given the system requirements. 
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 Development Times of Recent MDAPs vs. Software Size at IOC 
The COCOMO-II prediction curve shown here is notional. COCOMO-II takes as input 
up to 24 separate “effort multiplier” parameters and five “scale factors” related to economies 
(or diseconomies) of scale for software projects. The curve shown here corresponds to a 
software project that is modestly above average in all dimensions.6 It is intended to provide 
an empirically based estimate of the proper scaling of duration as a function of size for 
software similar to the kind found in Department of Defense (DoD) weapon systems. 
Astonishingly, without any adjustment, these initial parameter choices produce a curve that 
seems to behave like a tight lower bound on cycle time for the systems in question. This 
suggests that even if software is not already defining the lower bound for MDAP cycle times, 
it soon will. 
Again, the space systems community may be slightly ahead of the DoD in reaching 
this conclusion. In a 2009 presentation, Dr. Steve Jolly (2009b) of Lockheed Martin Space 
Systems concluded, 
Software/firmware can no longer be treated as a subsystem. Systems 
engineering organizations need to engineer the software/avionics system—a 
change in leadership technical background. … The game has changed in 
developing space systems. Software and avionics have become the system 
[emphasis in original]. Structures, mechanisms, propulsion, etc. are all 
supporting this new system. 
                                            
 
 
6 For those familiar with COCOMO-II modeling, the curve shown in Figure 7 corresponds to an Effort 
Multiplier (EM) of 1.5 and an exponent (E) of 1.1. The EM reflects a development only slightly higher 
than nominal in difficulty or complexity in all dimensions. The exponent corresponds to a total Scale 
Factor (SF) of 18, which is very close to the SF value for a “nominal” development. 
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In a related article for NASA’s ASK Magazine, Jolly (2009a) speculates that this is 
because software now touches every part of the system. It is no longer an isolatable 
subsystem or module that can be designed in parallel with the system; it is the common 
element that ties together all parts of the system. The software is the integrating element, 
and as such must be the central feature of the design. 
Not all weapon systems are as software-intensive as a NASA space probe—but 
many of them are. In particular, when the role of software in the program is no longer such 
that the software can be treated as a separable module, but rather as an integrative 
framework, it will be necessary to manage the program as a software development project 
with associated hardware and cyber/physical integration, rather than as a hardware 
development project with associated software. 
Acquisition Implications 
What Can Be Had Quickly? 
Putting together the data regarding system complexity, software content, and 
technology maturity, we can see that acquisition cycle times are bounded below by the 
maximum of several possible limiting factors. If the system is technically immature, we will 
not be able to field it very quickly. If the system involves very large amounts of new software, 
or highly integrated software and hardware, we will not be able to field it very quickly. This 
would be true even with ideal program management, ample and stable funding, and 
Acquisition Reform that eliminates all red tape and oversight. 
So what can we get quickly? 
1. Truly non-developmental items—commercial products and systems that 
already exist. (Think MRAP.7) 
2. Upgrades of existing systems that insert already-mature technology and do 
not overstrain the size, weight, power, and cooling capacity of the current 
platform. (Think UH-60M or M1A2 Abrams upgrades.) 
3. Integration of existing mature systems into new capabilities. (Think 
HIMARS.8) 
4. New systems developed using agile methods, in which users (user 
representatives) work interactively with developers to identify and evolve a 
set of capabilities that are useful enough to be worth fielding, rather than 
working toward pre-set Threshold and Objective requirements. (Think 
CREW.9) 
5. New systems with extremely limited requirements, where we are willing to live 
with capabilities at or below current systems in most dimensions, in order to 
get enhanced capabilities in one or two urgently needed dimensions. (Think 
F-117A.) 
                                            
 
 
7 Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected family of vehicles. 
8 High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System, derived by mounting a Multiple Launch Rocket System 
(MLRS) launcher on a 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) truck. 
9 Counter-radio-controlled Explosive Device program; a cumulative series of technology deployments 
including (for example) the Thor III man-portable jammer. 
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6. New systems whose critical technologies and basic operational 
characteristics have already been demonstrated at TRL 5 or higher in push 
research and development or demonstration programs. (Think Predator.) 
7. New modular subsystems that can be used to replace older, less-capable 
subsystems on platforms that have both modular architectures and sufficient 
design margin (e.g., size, weight, power, cooling, etc.) to be able to 
accommodate and integrate the new technology. (Think DDG-51 
Modernization.) 
Of these approaches, only the final three or four have the potential to sometimes 
produce leap-ahead technology advantage. Each of those, in turn, has its limitations and 
caveats. 
In the case of “limited requirements” developments, operational effectiveness is 
liable to be short-lived, requiring more deliberate follow-on programs that incorporate the 
leap-ahead technology in a more well-rounded package. In the case of R&D push from 
technology demonstration programs, someone has to have had the foresight to fund many 
research and development programs (not associated with major systems procurement) in 
the relevant technology areas over the preceding decade, so that there are mature 
technologies on the shelf to choose among. Even then, the initial MDAP incorporating those 
technologies is liable to produce a partially successful and fragile initial solution that will 
need to be followed up with more robust designs, as was the case with Predator.  
Rapid incorporation of new modular subsystems on an existing platform depends on 
the existence of a robust, overdesigned, modular-architecture platform that can host the 
upgrades. Initial development and deployment of those host platforms will typically not be 
especially rapid, and their initial capabilities may not be significantly better than legacy 
platforms. Their value is in their ability to enable future upgrades (see, for example, Patel & 
Fischerkeller, 2013).  
Finally, in the case of agile development, you would have to get very lucky to 
produce a leap-ahead capability. Most iterative agile developments will produce useful and 
timely (but not revolutionary) capabilities. 
When Should an Analysis of Alternatives Consider Cycle Time? 
The most important decision in any acquisition is the choice of what to buy. The 
purpose of the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is to provide decision-makers with all of the 
relevant information regarding the cost, schedule, and effectiveness of each of the available 
alternatives—including a characterization of the risks in each of those dimensions. The 
worst acquisition failures are the result of choosing an alternative that is not physically 
possible, or is unaffordable, or has very little chance of being delivered in time to be useful. 
Historically, schedule has not generally been considered as either a consequence of 
the choice of alternative, or as a Key Performance Parameter for the program. In some 
cases, this makes perfect sense—most any alternative for a peacetime tactical wheeled 
vehicle program will take about the same amount of time to develop, and there is little risk of 
early obsolescence regardless of which design approach is selected.  
For other types of systems, decision-makers should care intensely about the trade-
off between capability and cycle time. For example, missile countermeasures for aircraft are 
typically designed to counter specific threat systems. There is little point to a 
countermeasure development program that is unlikely to produce any deployable system 
until after the anticipated service life of the systems it counters. In addition, current capability 
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gaps in countermeasures are exploitable today by potential foes. Even a partial solution 
today (or at least soon) would be more valuable than a perfect solution 10 years from now. 
It seems only prudent that military planners should have some idea of the time 
urgency of a given system’s development and should take that urgency into account when 
choosing among proposed alternative system designs. Of course, this would also require 
both honest and credible schedule estimates for all of the candidate alternatives. 
What About Maintaining Technological Superiority? 
Much of the concern about acquisition cycle time that has been expressed by DoD 
officials and Congress has to do with maintaining the historical technological advantage of 
the United States in military systems. Our all-volunteer force relies operationally on 
capability overmatch in lieu of sheer numbers, even as it relies morally on exceptional levels 
of force protection and defensive capability. Given the pace of advance for electronics and 
cybernetic systems in the private sector and by foreign militaries, staying ahead of the curve 
would seem to require introducing new technologies on impossibly fast timelines. 
As we have discussed above, there are a limited number of potential ways to 
develop new capabilities on sufficiently responsive timelines. For all but the smallest 
systems, these methods depend on having taken early and effective action, both within and 
outside the formal “acquisition” process, in order to be ready to acquire useful systems 
quickly when the time comes. The two most effective ways to get leap-ahead capabilities on 
short timelines are both cases of technology insertion. In the first, a weapon system 
developed as part of a requirements-free technology demonstration project forms the basis 
for an acquisition program that finishes making the system sufficiently safe, effective, and 
suitable for operational use. In the second, a novel technology—itself possibly derived from 
a Science and Technology program or demonstration project—is inserted onto an existing 
platform or system. In both cases, it is vital that preparatory actions (and spending) have 
been made in the past—actions that permit the new program to avoid design false starts, 
inefficient concurrent development of platform and modules, and premature convergence on 
suboptimal designs. It would seem, then, that the key to being able to maintain technological 
superiority is to have executed the right set of deliberate actions in the past, on a rolling 
horizon. 
Conclusions 
Why Haven’t Cycle Times Been Increasing? 
In hindsight, it is surprising that cycle times have not shown a general increase over 
time. We know that the systems we develop and field have grown enormously in complexity, 
and that this growth is reflected by increased development cost and unit procurement cost, 
relative to the legacy systems that we replace or upgrade. This is not simply inflation or price 
hikes; the new systems are much more technologically advanced than the old ones, even 
relative to the current state of the art in commercial systems. How then have cycle times 
managed to remain stable? 
One plausible answer is that our design and manufacturing capabilities have roughly 
kept pace with the increased complexity of the systems we procure. This is in part a 
tautology, enforced by the fact that we cannot build anything we do not know how to build. 
Those systems that sought to surpass the current state of the art by too much were 
cancelled, and so do not contribute to the observed statistics. 
This is not a stable state of affairs. In particular, software productivity has historically 
grown much less rapidly than hardware system capability, and much less rapidly than the 
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amount of software required for our most complex defense systems. In addition, complex 
software shows diseconomies of scale, so that development efficiency decreases with the 
size of the software to be developed. As we shift more and more of the functionality of our 
defense systems into software, we can expect to see a corresponding increase in 
development lead times. 
Finally, we note that these findings may have significant implications for Acquisition 
Reform. If there are fundamental technical limits to how quickly certain types of systems can 
be acquired, no amount of management savvy or relief from regulatory burden will allow us 
to acquire those kinds of systems any faster than that. Reducing cycle time would thus need 
to involve a combination of using the “ways to acquire things quickly” (enumerated in the 
What Can Be Had Quickly section) with processes and regulations designed to facilitate 
those acquisition paths. It would also involve effective oversight to recognize what is feasible 
as early in the acquisition cycle as possible, and to choose acquisition alternatives 
accordingly.  
Summary 
Looking back at the past 30 years of major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs), 
we note the following patterns: 
 The median cycle time and the distribution of cycle times for the majority of 
MDAPs have been fairly constant. 
 The number of extreme outliers from this distribution has been growing over 
time. Outliers are more frequent in the most expensive programs and in 
software-intensive programs. 
 Cycle time growth has been increasing, especially in C3I and Space 
programs. Much of this growth seems to be associated with overly optimistic 
schedule estimates. 
 The amount of software in the most software-intensive MDAPs has increased 
by at least two orders of magnitude over the period in question. There is 
reason to believe that software (including software-hardware integration) is 
becoming, or has become, a schedule-limiting factor for these programs. 
If program complexity in general, and software content in particular, are now limiting 
factors for the development lead times of new systems, this has important implications for 
how we choose which new programs to begin. When it is important to get new things 
quickly, we will need to test the system designs that are proposed (using credible schedule 
estimates for those designs) against our best estimates of the urgency and useful life span 
of the capability being acquired. In particular, we need to be aware when we are asking for 
an amount of software that cannot plausibly be developed in the time available. 
In some cases, we will be able to get useful systems quickly enough simply by 
asking for less initial capability. For those capability gaps where existing technologies are 
not sufficient, it would be prudent to invest (on an ongoing basis) sufficient resources in 
broad technology development and maturation efforts to “keep the shelves stocked” with 
mature technologies. In parallel with those efforts, we would also need to design and field 
(also on an ongoing basis) flexible platforms that can quickly incorporate whichever of those 
as-yet-unidentified future technologies turn out to be needed. The technology development 
half of that plan is cost-prohibitive if we try to do it primarily within MDAPs; the future 
insertion half will not succeed if we allow requirements creep during initial development to 
trade away flexibility for immediate utility. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 88 - 
References 
Army Strong: Equipped, Trained and Ready: Final Report of the 2010 Army Acquisition 
Review (2011). [Decker-Wagner report]. Retrieved from 
http://www.rdecom.army.mil/EDCG%20Telecoms/Final%20Report_Army%20Acq%20R
eview.pdf  
Brooks, F. P. (1975). The mythical man-month: essays on software engineering. Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley.  
Jolly, S. (2009a). Is software broken? ASK Magazine, 22–25. Retrieved from 
http://appel.nasa.gov/2009/03/01/is-software-broken/  
Jolly, S. (2009b, June). System of systems in space exploration: Is software broken? Paper 
presented at the IEEE Fourth International Conference on System of Systems 
Engineering, Albuquerque, NM. 
Kendall, F. (2014). Better Buying Power 3.0 (White paper). Washington, DC: Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
Patel, P., & Fischerkeller, M. (2013). Prepare to be wrong: Assessing and designing for 
adaptability, flexibility, and responsiveness (IDA Paper P-5005). Alexandria, VA: 
Institute for Defense Analyses. 
Putnam, L. H. (1978). A general empirical solution to the macro software sizing and 
estimating problem. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, SE-4(4), 345–361. 
Riposo, J., McKernan, M., & Kaihoi, C. (2014). Prolonged cycle times and schedule growth 
in defense acquisition: A literature review (Report RR-455). Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 
Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR455.html  
Schultz, B. (2014). Please reduce cycle time. Defense AT&L Magazine, XLIII(6), 4–7. 




This work was performed under contract HQ0034-14-D-0001 for the Director, 
Acquisition Resources and Analysis, OUSD/AT&L. 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
RRR=aóÉê=oç~ÇI=fåÖÉêëçää=e~ää=
jçåíÉêÉóI=`^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.net 
 
